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CHAPTER 12
Deception During Armed Conflict
12.1 GENERAL

T

he law of anned conflict pennits deceiving the enemy through stratagems
and ruses ofwar intended to mislead him, to deter him from taking action,
or to induce him to act recklessly, provided the ruses do not violate rules of
intemationallaw applicable to anned conflict. 1

12.1.1 Pennitted Deceptions. Stratagems and ruses of war pennitted in
anned conflict include such deceptions as camouflage, deceptive lighting,
dummy ships and other annament, decoys, simulated forces, feigned attacks and
withdrawals, ambushes, false intelligence information, electronic deceptions,
and utilization of enemy codes, passwords, and countersigns. 2
1. Lieber Code, art. 101; HR, art. 24; GP I, art. 37(2). These rules are considered applicable
to warfare at sea. Hall, False Colors and Dununy Ships: The Use of Ruse in Naval Warfare, Nav.
War ColI. Rev., Sununer 1989, at 54-55, sets out a useful flowchart for analysis of proposed
deception. See also Green 138,139,169 & 170.
See paragraph 5.4.2, note 34 (p. 303) regarding the U.S. decision not to seek ratification ofGP 1.
"Rules ofintemationallaw applicable in armed conflict" has been defined as "the rules applicable
in armed conflict set forth in international agreements to which the Parties to the conflict are
Parties and the generally recognized principles and rules ofintemationallaw which are applicable
to armed conflict." GP I, art. 2(b). See also paragraph 6.2.2, note 34 (p. 335), for the ICRC
definition of "intemational humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict."·
2. NWIP 10-2, para. 640 n.41; AFP 110-34, para. 5-1; AFP 110-31, paras. 8-3b & 8-4; FM
27-10, para. 51; DA Pam 27-161-2, at 57; British Manual of Military Law, Part III, para. 312
(1958); 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 428-30; GP I, art. 37(2); Green 139. See Hartcup,
Camouflage: A History ofConcealment and Deception in War (1980) and Glantz, Soviet Military
Deception in the Second World War (1989). These acts are not perfidious because they do not
invite the confidence of the enemy with respect to protection under the law. GP I, art. 37(2).
Other permissible deceptions include traps; mock operations; feigned retreats or flights; surprise
attacks; simulation of quiet and inactivity; use ofsmall units to simulate large units; use of dununy
aircraft, vehicles, airfields, weapons and mines to create a fictitious force; moving landmarks and
route markers; pretending to conununicate with forces or reinforcements which do not exist;
deceptive supply movements; and allowing false messages to fall into enemy hands. See Montagu,
The Man Who Never Was (1954), for an account ofa British ruse during World War II regarding
the invasion of Europe. It is permissible to attempt to frustrate target intelligence activity, for
example by the employment ofruses to conceal, deceive and confuse reconnaissance means. The
prohibition in GP I, art. 39, against the use of the adversary's "military emblems, insignia or
uniforms" refers only to concrete visual objects and not to his signals and codes. Bothe, Partsch &
(continued ...)
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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2.(... continued)
Solf214. The United States does not support the prohibition in art. 39 on the use of enemy
emblems, insignia and uniforms during military operations except in actual armed engagement.
See paragraph 12.5.3 (p. 513).
AFP 110-31, para. 8-4b, provides the following additional examples of lawful ruses:
(1) The use of aircraft decoys. Slower or older aircraft may be used as decoys to lure
hostile aircraft into combat with faster and newer aircraft held in reserve. The use ofaircraft
decoys to attract ground fire in order to identifY ground targets for attack by more
sophisticated aircraft is also permissible.
(2) Staging air combats. Another lawful ruse is the staging of air combat between two
properly marked friendly aircraft with the object of inducing an enemy aircraft into
entering the combat in aid of a supposed comrade.
(3) Imitation of enemy signals. No objection can be made to the use by friendly forces
of the signals or codes of an adversary. The signals or codes used by enemy aircraft or by
enemy ground installations in contact with their aircraft may properly be employed by
friendly forces to deceive or mislead an adversary. However, misuse of distress signals or
distinctive signals internationally recognized as reserved for the exclusive use of medical
aircraft would be perfidious.
(4) Use offlares and fires. The lighting oflarge fires away from the true target area for
the purpose ofmisleading enemy aircraft into believing that the large fires represent damage
from prior attacks and thus leading them to the wrong target is a lawful ruse. The target
marking flares of the enemy may also be used to mark false targets. However, it is an
unlawful ruse to fire false target flare indicators over residential areas ofa city or town which
are not otherwise valid military objectives.
(5) Camouflage use. The use of camouflage is a lawful ruse for misleading and
deceiving enemy combatants. The camouflage ofa flying aircraft must not conceal national
markings of the aircraft, and the camouflage must not take the form of the national
markings of the enemy or that of objects protected under international law.
(6) Operational ruses. The ruse of the "switched raid" is a proper method of aerial
warfare in which aircraft set a course, ostensibly for a particular target, and then, at a given
moment, alter course in order to strike another military objective instead. This method was
utilized successfully in World War II to deceive enemy fighter interceptor aircraft.
While it is common practice among nations to place national markings on both military aircraft
and vessels, it is unclear if international law requires nations to do so. The legality of the use of
unmarked military aircraft or vessels in combat is unsettled as operational requirements
occasionally dictate that markings not be used. Compare Jacobsen, AJuridicalExamination of the
Israeli Attack on the U.S.S. Uberty, 36 Nav. L. Rev. 41-44 (1986) (the use of unmarked Israeli
aircraft to attack USS LIBERTY on 8 June 1967) with AFP 110-31, para. 7-4 (superfluous
marking not required, as "when no other aircraft except those belonging to a single state are
flown"). Failure to mark vessels and aircraft clearly in peacetime results in the loss of certain
privileges and immunities for such aircraft or vessels, and quite likely for the crew as well. See 1982
LOS Convention, arts. 29 & 107, and Chicago Convention, arts. 20 & 89 (reflecting customary
international law on the importance of external markings on aircraft and vessels). See also
paragraphs 2.1.1 (p. 109) and 2.2.1 (p. 114) for a discussion, respectively, of warships and military
aircraft.
(continued ...)
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12.1.2 Prohibited Deceptions. The use of unlawful deceptions is called
"perfidy." Acts of perfidy are deceptions designed to invite the confidence of the
enemy to lead him to believe that he is entided to, or is obliged to accord, protected
status under the law of anned conflict, with the intent to betray that confidence. 3
Feigning surrender in order to lure the enemy into a trap is an act of perfidy.4
2.(... continued)
The use of deceptive measures to thwart precision guided weapons is legally permissible. Flares,
smoke and aerosol material and dissemination devices can lawfully be used as countermeasures
against visually guided, laser-guided, infrared and television-guided missiles. Chaff is a lawful
countermeasure against active radar-homing missiles. Infrared-absorbing paint and flare
technology are lawful countermeasures against infrared sensors.
It would be a legitimate ruse to use the electronic transponder aboard a combatant
aircraft to respond with the code used for identifYing friendly aircraft (IFF), but it
would be perfidious to use for this purpose the electronic signal established under
annex I, Art. 8, [GP I] for the exclusive use of medical aircraft. Similarly, the use of
distress signals established under the Radio Regulations of the International
Telecommunications Union is prohibited under the second sentence of Art. 38,
para. I [ofGP I] and might also be violative of Art. 37 [ofGP I].
Bothe, Partsch & Solf 207, dting 10 Whiteman 399. The United States considers that GP I, arts. 37 and
38 reflect customary intemationallaw. Matheson, remarks, paragraph 11.1, note 2 (p. 481) at 425.
During Operation Desert Storm, Coalition Forces employed psychological operations involving
air-dropped leaflets and radio broadcasts to destroy enemy morale and to induce Iraqi troops to
surrender. Tide V Report, atJ-536 to 38.
Under the definition of perfidy in GP I it would be improper to disseminate talse intelligence
reports intended to induce the enemy to attack civilians and civilian objects in the mistaken belief
that they are military objects. See also paragraphs 8.1.2 (p. 403) and 8.5.1.1 (p. 423). On the other
hand, it is a common practice, not prohibited by GP I, to disguise a military object to appear to be a
civilian object. See, for example, the cover and deception tactics used in World War II and
described in Fisher, The War Magician (1983); Reit, Masquerade: The Amazing Camouflage
Deceptions of World War II (1978); Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (1975) (D-Day, 1944); Holmes,
Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II
(1979); and sources cited therein. World War I examples may be found in the sources cited in AFP
110-31, para. 8-4b n.5.
It is not perfidious to use spies and secret agents, encourage defection or insurrection among the
enemy, or encourage enemy combatants to desert, surrender or rebel. Bothe, Partsch & Solf. 207.
Enemy personnel that do desert and surrender cannot be compelled to take an oath ofallegiance to
the captor. Green 140-41.
Dewar, The Art of Deception in Warfare (1989) develops a modern theory of deception. Many
modern deception tactics are, of course, classified. See OPNAVINST 3070.1 (series), Subj:
Operations Security; Joint Pub 18, Subj: Operations Security; and OPNAVINST S3430.21
(series), Subj: Electronics Warfare Operations Security. See also OPNAVINST S3490.1 (series),
Subj: Military Deception.
3. This definition appears for the first time in GP I, art. 37(1); perfidy had not been previously
defined in treaty law. The United States supports the principle that "individual combatants not
kill, injure, or capture enemy personnel by resort to perfidy." Matheson, remarks, paragraph 11.1,
note 2 (p. 481) at 425. The rationale for this rule is that if protected status or protective signs,
signals, symbols, and emblems are abused they will lose their effectiveness and put protected
persons and places at additional risk.
4. 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 342; San Remo Manual, para. 111.
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12.2 MISUSE OF PROTECTIVE SIGNS, SIGNALS, AND
SYMBOLS
Misuse of protective signs, signals, and symbols (see paragraphs 11.9 and
11.10) in order to injure, kill, or capture the enemy constitutes an act of perfidy.
Such acts are prohibited because they undermine the effectiveness of protective
signs, signals, and symbols and thereby jeopardize the safety of noncombatants
and the immunity of protected structures and activities. For example, using an
ambulance or medical aircraft marked with the red cross or red crescent to carry
armed combatants, weapons, or ammunition with which to attack or elude
enemy forces is prohibited. 5 Similarly, use of the white flag to gain a military
advantage over the enemy is unlawful. 6
5. This customary rule derives from HR, arts. 23(f) & 27; Hague V, art. 5; GWS-Sea, arts. 30,
34,35,41 & 45; GWS, arts. 21, 22, 35 &36; GC, arts. 18,20-22; GPW, art. 23; RoerichPact,arts.
1 & 5. See FM 27-10, para. 55; DA Pam 27-161-2, at 53; AFP 11 0-31, paras. 8-3c, 8-6a(1) & 8-6b;
AFP 110-34, para. 5-1 a; Slim, Protection ofthe Red Cross and Red Crescent Emblems, 1989 Int'l
Rev. Red Cross 420; and Green 290-91. See also GP I, arts. 18(6) & 38, and Hague Cultural
Property Convention (paragraph 8.5.1.6, note 122 (p. 425», arts. 17(3) & (4). The protective
signs, symbols, and emblems are illustrated in Figure 11-1 (pp. 503-505). Protective signals are
discussed in paragraph 11.10 (p. 500).
6. HR, arts. 23(f), 32 & 34; GP I, art. 37(1)(a). See also FM 27-10, paras. 52-53, 458-61 &
504; 2 Oppenheim- Lauterpacht 541; Greenspan 320-21 & 384-85. The white flag symbolizes a
request to cease fire, negotiate or surrender. HR, arts. 23(f) & 32; FM 27-10, paras. 53 & 458; AFP
110-34, para. 5-1b; Greenspan 320-21 & 384-85; 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 541. Displaying a
white flag before attack to cause the enemy to cease firing is prohibited. As misuse of the red cross
(or red crescent) could result in attacks on the sick and wounded, misuse of the white flag might
prevent efforts to negotiate on important matters.
However, the enemy is not required to cease firing when a white flag is raised. To indicate that the
hoisting is authorized by its commander, the appearance of the flag should be accompanied or
followed prompdy by a complete cessation of fire from that side. Further, the commander
authorizing the hoisting of the flag should also prompdy send one or more parlementaires. FM
27-10, para. 458, at 167; AFP 110-31, para. 8-6a(2). SeeDA Pam 27-161-2, at 53. (Parlementaires
are designated personnel employed by military commanders of belligerent forces to pass through
enemy lines in order to negotiate or communicate openly and direcdy with enemy commanders.
Cj FM 27-10, para. 459, at 167; HR 32; Levie, 1 The Code ofInternationalArrned Conflict 154;
Green 88-9.) See also paragraph 11.7 and note 43 (p. 489) regarding surrender. Application of
these principles was illustrated during the batde for Goose Green in the Falklands/Malvinas
conflict when some Argentine soldiers may have raised a white flag and others then killed three
British soldiers advancing to accept what they thought was a surrender. Higgenbotham, Case
Studies in the Law ofLand Warfare II: The Campaign in the Falklands, 64 Mil. Rev., Oct. 1984, at
53 ("Whatever the case was at Goose Green, there was no requirement for the British to expose
themselves. The hoister of the white flag is the one expected to come forward, and that is what
should have been required of the Argentine soldiers in this case."); Middlebrook, Operation
Corporate: The Falklands War, 1982, at 269-70. But see Middlebrook, The Fight for the
'Malvinas' 189-90 (1989) (British officer killed when returning from an attempt to negotiate a
local surrender with Argentine forces).
(continued...)
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12.3 NEUTRAL FLAGS, INSIGNIA, AND UNIFORMS
12.3.1 At Sea. Under the customary international law of naval warfare, it is
pennissible for a belligerent warship to fly false colors and disguise its outward
appearance in other ways in order to deceive the enemy into believing the vessel
is of neutral nationality or is other than a warship. However, it is unlawful for
warship to go into action without first showing her true colors. 7 Use of neutral
flags, insignia, or uniforms during an actual armed engagement at sea IS,
therefore, forbidden. 8

a

6.(... continued)
Similarly, international law prohibits pretending to surrender or requesting quarter in order to
attack an enemy because of the obligation of combatants to respect opposing combatants who are
hOTS de combat or have surrendered. For an account of the perfidious use of the white flag by Iraqi
forces during the Persian GulfWar see Tide V Report, at 0-621. A fulse broadcast to the enemy that
an armistice has been agreed upon has been widely recognized to be perfidious.
7. 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 509.
The ruse which is of most practical importance in naval warfare is the use of the false
flag. It now seems to be fairly well established by the custom of the sea that a ship is
justified in wearing false colours for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, provided
that she goes into action under her true colours. The celebrated Gennan cruiser
"Emden" made use of this strategem in 1914 when she entered the harbour of
Penang [on 28 October] under [then neutral] Japanese colours, hoisted her proper
ensign, and then torpedoed a Russian cruiser lying at anchor. It is equally permissible
for a warship to disguise her outward appearance in other ways and even to pose as a
merchant ship, provided that she hoists the naval ensign before opening fire.
Merchant vessels themselves are also at liberty to deceive enemy cruisers in this way.
Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 115-16 (3d ed. 1959), citing Corbett, 1 Naval Operations
350 (1920).
Sources differ as to which flag EMDEN was actually flying on entry into Penang harbor. Van der
Vat, Gendemen of War 86-87 (1983) (the British white ensign); Lochner, The Last
Gendeman-of-War: The Raider Exploits of the Cruiser Emden 151 (1979, Lindauer ttansl. 1988),
which van der Vat claims is exhaustive, states EMDEN flew no flag as she entered Penang harbor.
Corbett states that the flag appeared to be the British white ensign. 2 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht 510
states that EMDEN was flying the Japanese flag. Flying the enemy flag at sea is discussed in
paragraph 12.5.1 (p. 512).
GP I, art. 39(3), explicidy states that no changes in the rules applicable to the conduct ofwar at sea
(as set out in the text of paragraph 12.3.1) are made by arts. 39 or 37(1)(d) of that Protocol.
Nevertheless the use of these ruses by naval forces today may be politically sensitive, since using
neutral emblems might lead a party erroneously to conclude that a neutral has given up its
neutrality (see Chapter 7) and entered the fighting on the other side. This could lead to an attack or
declaration of war on the neutral. AFP 110-34, para. 5-1c; Smith 116-18; Tucker 140-41. See
paragraph 12.7 (p. 514) regarding fulse claims of noncombatant status.
8. 2 Lauterpacht-Oppenheim 509; San Remo Manual, paras. 110 & 111; Heinegg, The Law
of Armed Conflict at Sea, in Fleck at 422.
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12.3.2 In the Air. Use in combat of false or deceptive markings to disguise
belligerent military aircraft as being of neutral nationality is prohibited. 9
12.3.3 On Land. The law of armed conflict applicable to land warfare has no
rule of law analogous to that which permits belligerent warships to display
neutral colors. Belligerents engaged in armed conflict on land are not permitted
to use the flags, insignia, or uniforms ofa neutral nation to deceive the enemy. 10
12.4 THE UNITED NATIONS FLAG AND EMBLEM
The flag of the United Nations and the letters "UN"ll may not be used in
armed conflict for any purpose without the authorization of the United
Nations. 12
12.5 ENEMY FLAGS, INSIGNIA, AND UNIFORMS
12.5.1 At Sea. Naval surface and subsurface forces may fly enemy colors and
display enemy markings to deceive the enemy. Warships must, however, display
their true colors prior to an actual armed engagement. 13
9. AFP 110-31, para. 7-4 & n.5; San Remo Manual, para. 109.
10. This customary rule is codified in GP I, art. 39(1), and applies whether in attack or to
promote the interest ofa parry to the conflict in the conduct of that conflict. CDDHI215/Rev.l,
para. 38; 15 Official Records 259; Bothe, Partsch & Solf, para. 2.2, at 213. "The purpose behind
this rule is to avoid escalation of armed conflict to neutral countries in the mistaken belief that the
neutral State had abandoned its neutrality." Bothe, Partsch & Solf213. See also Oeter, Methods
and Means of Combat, in Fleck at 202; Green 138-39.
11. The United Nations flag is white on light blue; the letters "UN" are its emblem.
12. GP I, art. 37 (1)(d), defines as perfidy in land warfare "the feigning ofprotected status by the
use ofsigns, emblems or uniforms ofthe United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to
the conflict." In addition, GP I, art. 38(2), states that "[ilt is prohibited to make use of the
distinctive emblem of the United Nations, except as authorized by that Organization." See AFP
110-34, para. 5-ld. The United States concurs with tillS statement and has extended its application
to operations at sea as a matter of U.S. policy.
13. This rule with respect to warships has precedent in the skillful disguise of German armed
raiders in W orid Wars I and II. Tucker 140 n.37; Muggenthaler, German Raiders ofWorid War II
(1977); Woodward, The Secret Raiders: The Story of the German Armed Merchant Raiders in
the Second Wodd War (1955). The EMDEN added a false fourth funnel for her entry into Penang
in 1914 to make her resemble a British cruiser of the YARMOUTH class. See sources cited in
paragraph 12.3.1, note 7 (p. 511). On 27128 March 1942, HMS CAMPBELTOWN (ex-USS
BUCHANAN), with two stacks removed and her two remaining funnels cut off at an angle to
resemble a German torpedo-boat destroyer entered St. Nazaire harbor in German-occupied
Brittany and rammed herself hard up on the outer lock of the the only dry dock large enough to
take the German battleship TIRPITZ. Hours later she was blown up with timed charges, putting
the dry dock out of the war. (The attack was facilitated by CAMPBELTOWN's responses to
German challenges and gun fire with flashing light delaying signal using the call sign of one of the
German ships in the local flotilla, and to anotherwith.~ait," followed by the emergency signal,
(continued...)
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12.5.2 In the Air. The use in combat ofenemy markings by belligerent military
aircraft is forbidden. 14
12.5.3 On Land. The law of land warfare does not prohibit the use by
belligerent land forces of enemy flags, insignia, or uniforms to deceive the enemy
either before or following an armed engagement. 15 Combatants risk severe
punishment, however, if they are captured while displaying enemy colors or
insignia or wearing enemy uniforms in combat. 16
Similarly, combatants caught behind enemy lines wearing the uniform of
their adversaries are not entided to prisoner-of-war status or protection and,
historically, have been subjected to severe punishment. 17 It is permissible,
however, for downed aircrews and escaping prisoners of war to use enemy
uniforms to evade capture, so long as they do not attack enemy forces, collect
13.(... continued)
"Am being fired upon by friendly forces." See paragraph 12.1.1, note 2 (p. 507).) Haines,
Destroyers at War 73-80 (1982); Calvocoressi & Wint, Total War 450 (1972); Piekalkiewick, Sea
War 1939-1945, at 206 (1987); Roskill, 2 The War at Sea 1939-1945, at 168-73 (1956).
A belligerent may prosecute as a war crime the use ofits ensigns, emblems or uniforms by enemy
forces during actual military operations against it. AFP 110-31, para. 5-1e. See also Heinegg,
paragraph 12.3.1, note 8 (p. 511) at 422.
14. Tucker142 & n.43; AFP 110-31, paras. 7-4 & 8-4b(5). This rule may be explained by the
fact that an aircraft, once airbome, is generally unable to change its markings prior to actual attack
as could a warship. Additionally, the speed with which an aircraft can approach a target (in
comparison with warships) would render ineffective any attempt to display true markings at the
instant of attack.
15. HR, art. 23(£), forbids "improper use ... of the national flag, or ofthe military insignia and
uniform of the enemy." "Improper use" of an enemy's flags, military insignia, national markings
and uniforms involves use in actual attacks. This clarification is necessary because disputes arose
concerning the meaning of the term "improper" during W orId War II. Bothe, Partsch & Solf
212-15. A reciprocal advantage is secured from observing this rule. It is clear, however, that this
article does not change or affect the law concerning whether a combatant is entitled to PW status.
That question is a separate matter determined by the GPW, as well as other applicable intemational
law. AFP 110-31, para. 8-6c. See also DA Pam 27-161-2, at 53.
16. This is based on the necessity to maintain security and to prevent surprise by the enemy.
AFP 110-34, para. 5-1e(I).
GP I, arts. 37 & 39(2), provide that even prior to combat the use of enemy flags, insignia, and
uniforms to shield, favor, protect or impede military operations is prohibited, thereby attempting
to reverse the rule derived from U.S. v. Skorzeny, 9 LRTWC 90 (1949), summarized in DA Pam
27-161-2, at 53-56, and reflected in FM 27-10, para. 54. See also 10 Whiteman 395-98.
Acceptance of this rule would prevent their use as a disguise during any military operation on or
over land preparatory to an attack and appears to be impracticable. Bothe, Partsch & Solf 214.
The United States considers this departure to be militarily unacceptable since "there are certain
adversarial forces that would use enemy uniforms in their operations in any case [and thus] it is
important from the beginning to preserve that option for the United States as well." Matheson
remarks, paragraph 11.1, note 2 (p. 481) at 425 & 435.
17. FM 27-10, paras. 75-78; DA Pam 27-161-2, at 59; AFP 110-31, para. 9-2b.
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military intelligence, or engage in similar military operations while so attired. 18
As a general rule, enemy markings should be removed from captured enemy
.
b efcore It
..IS use d·In combat. 19
eqmpment

12.6 FEIGNING DISTRESS
It is unlawful to feign distress through the false use of internationally
recognized distress signals such as SOS and MAYDAy. 20 In air warfare,
however, it is permissible to feign disablement or other distress as a means to
induce the enemy to break off an attack. Consequendy, there is no obligation in
air warfare to cease attacking a belligerent military aircraft that appears to be
disabled. 21 However, if one knows the enemy aircraft is disabled so as to
permanendy remove it from the conflict (e.g., major fire or structural damage)
there is an obligation to cease attacking to permit possible evacuation by crew or
passengers. 22

12.7 FALSE CLAIMS OF NONCOMBATANT STATUS
It IS a violation of the law of armed conflict to kill, injure, or capture the
enemy by false indication of an intent to surrender or by fei~ng shipwreck,
sickness, wounds, or civilian status (but see paragraph 12.3.1).2 Asurpriseattack
18. Bothe, Partsch & SoIf214-15; AFP 110-34, para. 5-1e. See also paragraph 12.7, note 24
(p.515).
19. Unmarked or camouflaged captured material may, however, be used immediately. Using
foreign military uniforms or equipment in training to promote realism and recognition is not
prohibited by international law. Cf Bothe, Partsch & SoIf214.
20. GP I, art. 38(1); AFP 110-34, para. 5-1a; AFP 110-31, para. 8-6a(1); FM 27-10, para. 55;
and Bothe, Partsch & SoIf207 n.25; Draft Hague Radio Rules, 1923, art. 10; Greenspan 321; 10
Whiteman 399. See paragraph 11.10 (p. 500). However, a sick or wounded combatant does not
commit perfidy by calling for and receiving medical aid even though he may be intending
immediately to resume fighting.
21. AFP 110-34, para. 5-1g; AFP 110-31, para. 4-2d. Further, the practice of submarines in
releasing oil and debris to feign success of a depth charge or torpedo attack has never been
considered to be unlawful.
22. AFP 110-31, para. 4-2d. There is no duty to cease attack if the disabled aircraft is
nevertheless capable of or intent on causing destruction, as for example were the Kamikaze pilots
during the latter stages of World War II.
23. HR, art. 23(b); GP I, art. 37(1). Since civilians are not lawful objects of attack as such in
armed conflict, it follows that disguising combatants in civilian clothing in order to commit
hostilities constitutes perfidy. This is analogous to other situations where combatants attempt to
disguise their intentions behind the protections afforded by the law of armed conflict in order to
engage in hostilities. ICRC Report, Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation
and Development ofInternational Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva 24
May -12 June 1971, Rules Relative to Behavior of Combatants (1971); Greenspan 61;
Schwarzenberger, International Courts, The Law of Armed Conflict 110 & 114 (1968). See also
paragraph 12.2, note 6 (p. 510).
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by a person feigning shipwreck, sickness, or wounds undennines the protected
status of those rendered incapable of combat. Similarly, attacking enemy forces
while posing as a civilian puts all civilians at hazard. 24 Such acts of perfidy are
punishable as war crimes.

12.7.1 megal Combatants. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an
adversary by feigning civilian, non-combatant status. 25 If detennined by a
competent tribunal of the captor nation to be illegal combatants, such persons
may be denied prisoner-of-war status and be tried and punished. 26 It is the
policy of the United States, however, to accord illegal combatants
prisoner-of-war protection if they were carrying arms openly at the time of
capture. 27
12.8 SPIES
A spy is someone who, while in territory under enemy control or the zone of
operations of a belligerent force, seeks to obtain information while operating
under a false claim of noncombatant or friendly forces status with the intention of
passing that information to an opposing belligerent. 28 Members of the armed
24. These rules have developed in recognition of the reality that the enemy will be tempted to
attack civilians and the sick and wounded and refuse offers to surrender or negotiate, if it appears
dangerous to respect these persons or offers.
Feigning death in order to escape capture is not prohibited. PWs and downed aircrews may feign
civilian status for escape and evasion, and are not lawfully subject to punishment on that account if
captured. GPW, arts. 83, 89 & 93 in particular, recognize that the wearing ofcivilian clothing by a
PW to escape is permissible and not a violation ofthe law ofarmed conflict. It may, however, result
in disciplinary punishment under the GPW. Bothe, Partsch & Solf214-15; AFP 110-24, para.
5-le. PWs and downed aircrews should avoid combatant or espionage activities while so dressed
to avoid loss ofPW status ifcaptured. AFP 110-31 quotes FM 27-10 on the uniform requirements
of ground forces in para. 7-2; para. 7-3 provides a discussion of the policies regarding aircrews.
Of course it may be difficult to establish military identity if apprehended in civilian clothing.
Gathering information while feigning civilian status is discussed in paragraph 12.8 (p. 515).
25. Baxter, So-Called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs, 28 Brit.
Y.B. Int'l L. 323 (1951); GP I, art. 44(3) & (4). See paragraph 11.7 note 53 (p. 491) for U.S.
objections to provisions of GP I, art. 44(3) which blur the distinction between combatants and
noncombatants by according combatant status to persons not recognizable as such at a distance or
who do not carry their arms openly.
26. GPW, art. 5. For discussions of the tribunals, see paragraph 6.2.5.1, note 73 (p. 6-30) and
paragraph 11.8, note 73 (p. 495), 10 Whiteman 150-95, and Green 109.
27. AR 190-8, paragraph 11.7, note 47 (p. 490) at para. 1-5. Cj. NATQ STANAG 2044.
Prisoner-of-war protection is not synonymous with prisoner of war status. Illegal combatants are
not accorded prisoner of war status whether or not they were carrying arms openly at time of
capture. See also paragraph 11.7, note 53 (p. 491).
28. Lieber Code, art. 88(1); HR, art. 29; 10 U.S.C. sec. 906 (UCMJ, art. 106); 18 U.S.C. sec.
792-99.
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forces who penetrate enemy-held territory in civilian attire or enemy uniform to
collect intelligence are spies. 29 Conversely, personnel conducting
reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines while properly uniformed are not
. 30
sples.
Crewmembers of warships and military aircraft engaged in intelligence
collection missions in enemy waters or airspace are not s~ies unless the ship or
aircraft displays false civilian, neutral, or enemy marking. 1
12.8.1 Legal Status. Spying during armed conflict is not a violation of
international law. Captured spies are not, however, entided to prisoner-of-war
status. 32 The captor nation may try and punish spies in accordance with its
national law. 33 Should a spy succeed in eluding capture and return to friendly
territory, liability to punishment terminates. If subsequendy captured during
some other military operation, the former spy cannot be tried or punished for the
34
·
earIier act 0 f esplOnage.

29. HR, art. 29. See also Green 116-17,142-43.
30. HR, art. 29; GP I, art. 46(2). GP I purports to extend those protections beyond the zone of
operations of hostile forces to any territory controlled by the enemy, and thus negates the
possibility that members of the armed forces who openly seek to gather and transmit intelligence
information in the enemy's zone ofthe interior, including crews ofreconnaissance aircraft, may be
subject to national espionage legislation. GP I would require only that members of the armed
forces be in any customary uniform of their armed forces that clearly distinguishes the members
wearing it from nonmembers, including any distinctive sign which shows that the activity in
question had nothing clandestine about it. Bothe, Partsch & Solf265. The United States has not
indicated its acceptance of these new provisions.
31. AFP 110-31, para. 7-4. See Jacobsen, paragraph 12.1.1, note 2 (p. 508), at 21-32 for a
discussion of intelligence gathering on the high seas.
32. HR, art. 24; GP I, arts. 39(3) & 46(1). This is a statement of customary law. Bothe,
Partsch & Solf264-65; Green 190-91.
33. HR, art. 30; Baxter, paragraph 12.7.1, note 25 (p. 515), at 325. The United States would
grant such persons a trial that meets international standards for fuirness. Matheson remarks,
paragraph 11.1, note 2 (p. 481), at 427-28, that the United States "support[s] in particular the
fundamental guarantees contained in" GP I, art. 75, that entitle such persons to a trial that meets
international standards for fairness. See also paragraph 6.2.5.4, note 84 (p. 355). See AFP 110-31,
para. 9-2b, for a discussion of the UCMJ and other Federal statutes on espionage, such as 18 U.S.C.
sec. 792-99.
34. HR, art. 31; GP I, art. 46(4). These rules apply only to members of the armed forces,
including members of those resistance and guerrilla groups who qualifY under the applicable
international law as members of the armed forces (see paragraph 5.3 and note 11 thereunder
(p. 296» who gather information under false pretenses. Espionage by civilians remains covered by
HR, arts. 29 and 30, as supplemented by GC & GP I, as well as by the national law of espionage.
Bothe, Partsch & Solf267.

